Policy Report: Intergovernmental Relations with the Bangsamoro
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Institute for Autonomy and Governance organized the National Conference on Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) with the Bangsamoro last October 1, 2019.
In the conference, senior political leaders and technical experts who have had substantial experience with IGR, both as part of their usual work and as research endeavors, shared their insights to members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) and regional and local officials of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). More importantly, there were robust and thoughtful discussions about IGR during the formal Q&A sessions as well as in the sidelines.
This policy brief discusses the key insights from the speakers. It then continues this discussion by outlining two opportunities and two challenges brought by the task of integrating IGR in the BARMM. The first opportunity is IGR can lead to genuine and meaningful regional autonomy. IGR in a way reflects the asymmetric relationship between the central government and the BARMM regional government. It is indicative of parity between the two. Indeed, the IGR bodies are the features of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) which clearly demonstrate that the Bangsamoro government has an elevated status over other local governments in terms of its relationship with the central government.
The second opportunity is IGR can foster good governance in the BARMM. IGR can be seen as an innovative framework that provides an avenue for close coordination and effective management of government mandates in the region. More critically, IGR as both a governmental approach and structure constitutes a system of norms that give credence to accountability, rule of law and efficiency in public administration.
The first challenge to integrating IGR in the BARMM is balancing IGR with the President’s power of supervision. The BOL and the BARMM continue to exist within a unitary structure. IGR in a unitary system may become a “source of problem”, specially if presidential supervision and IGR aspirations are not balanced in the right way.
The second challenge is mainstreaming the IGR mindset in the BARMM. Mutual respect and a cooperative ethos between the different levels of government are extremely vital in implementing IGR. The underlying administrative culture may drastically influence the way in which institutional IGR arrangements operate on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, the pervading culture of dependence and deference to the center will make establishing an IGR mindset and culture in the BARMM very difficult.
Obviously, there is a lot of work to be done and the first on the list appears to be the activation of the Main IGR Body. And the reason for this is the fact that the BTA has already designated specific officials to represent their side while the President has already assigned the Department of Finance to spearhead the national government side and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process as representative to the joint secretariat. Nevertheless, the BTA, the national government, civil society organizations and academic institutions in the BARMM must keep in mind four caveats which were raised in the IGR National Conference.
The first one is that accomplishing all of the desired reforms for the BARMM, including IGR, will take time.
Second, it must be noted that IGR is already a familiar concept because this has been practiced even in the ARMM. The experience of former ARMM personalities in this particular area must not be ignored.
Third, the BOL is a national law. This means the national government is also responsible for the implementation of its provisions. Therefore, the national government has to fulfil its role in the activation of the IGR bodies.
Fourth and last, IGR is both a political and technical endeavor. The task of integrating IGR in the BARMM requires both imagination and innovation.
INTRODUCTION
Intergovernmental Relations or IGR is explained in academic literature as fundamentally the coming together of different orders of governments within a political system, through formal or informal processes, to work towards the achievement of common goals.
IGR mechanisms are utilized to facilitate cooperation and collaboration in both the policymaking process and in the delivery of public services. Having and utilizing IGR can resolve and even prevent conflicts between different levels of government and for them to avoid redundancies, duplication, unreasonable fragmentation and ineffective amalgamation. For this reason, IGR is now considered an integral component of good governance.
IGR is implemented through both formal and informal means. Formal mechanisms can be constitutional or statutory institutions. Informal IGR are traditional conventions or practices usually in the form of ad hoc councils and committees, as well as organized discussions or forums involving particular government officials.
IGR can occur in the vertical relationship between the national government and subnational governments. Whereas, horizontal IGR can involve some or all of the constituent units in a multi-level government system. Typically, horizontal relations between constituent units arise to deal with geographic trans-border issues (i.e. flood control or management of river systems).
Another dimension of IGR relates to particular policy sectors such as transportation, agriculture, tourism or preventing violent extremism. The scope, frequency and intensity of interaction can vary between policy sectors. Much depends on the financial importance of a particular policy area as well as its political relevance to the government of the day.
The concept of IGR is traditionally associated with federal systems. IGR processes have been described as the “lifeblood of federalism in practice.” But generally, IGR plays a critical role in a system where there are at least two levels of government because each level of government, while may have their own set of powers and responsibilities, will still need to work together. Indeed, many scholars maintain that IGR mechanisms can and do play a key function in unitary systems with embedded decentralization arrangements such as the Philippines.
For instance, IGR mechanisms are already prescribed in Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 13 exhibits an example of a formal and horizontal IGR. Arguably, this also sanctions the formation of a sectoral IGR platform.[1] And Section 14 offers an example of a formal and vertical IGR.[2]
The Local Government Code of 1991 has a specific chapter on IGR which prescribes a combination of formal, vertical and sectoral IGR mechanisms while some provisions also sanction informal IGR.[3] Notably, a slew of special laws also prescribes IGR (i.e. Solid Waste Management Act, Universal Health Care Act).
Of course, front and center now is IGR as prescribed by the BOL for the BARMM.[4] The following are the IGR bodies mandated in the BOL:
1. Main IGR Body
2. Philippine Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament Forum
3. Fiscal Policy Board
4. Joint Body for Zones of Joint Cooperation
5. Infrastructure Development Board
6. Energy Board
7. Sustainable Development Board
8. Council of Leaders
All are examples of formal and vertical IGR. Although from the perspective of the national government, it can be argued that the last one is a formal and horizontal IGR being a collective of LGUs and civil society within the BARMM.
The BOL is essentially an overhaul of the current regional autonomy framework. The BTA now functions as the regional government in the BARMM. The BTA is presently dealing with an extremely difficult to-do list and one of the most important tasks in this list is the activation of the various IGR bodies mandated by the BOL.
Recognizing the challenges inherent with such an undertaking, the Institute for Autonomy and Governance organized the National Conference on Intergovernmental Relations with the Bangsamoro last October 1, 2019. This conference is part of a broader project that is supported by the Australian Government through the Enhancing Political Dialogue for Inclusive Peace in the Bangsamoro project that seeks to help build strong socio-political institutions within the BARMM.
In the conference, senior political leaders and technical experts who have had substantial experience with IGR, both as part of their usual work and as research endeavors, shared their insights to members of the BTA and regional and local officials of the BARMM. More importantly, there were robust and thoughtful discussions about IGR during the formal Q&A sessions as well as in the sidelines. This policy brief is in a way an extension of these discussions on IGR.
DISCUSSION
INSIGHTS FROM SPEAKERS
Atty. Benedicto Bacani, Executive Director of IAG: There is really an urgent need to lay down the IGR structures and processes in the BOL. Underlying this is the importance of establishing a culture and a mindset of coordination and cooperation between and among all levels of government in the BARMM.
H.E. Steven Robinsons AO, Ambassador of Australia to the Philippines: The BARMM is indeed an exciting experiment but for it to be successful, everyone, meaning all levels of government, must work together. There must be smooth understanding and cooperation between the BARMM and the national government.
Lord Jack McConnel, Rt First Minister of Scotland, United Kingdom: There are processes involved in IGR. The Bangsamoro government must set procedures for consultations, for resolving disagreements, for discussing financial issues just to name a few. But it must be noted that accomplishing all of these things will take time. It is important to keep in mind as well that these kinds of governance reforms can change the lives of the Bangsamoro people for the better.
Wilben Mayor, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Peace and Reconciliation and Unity: Inclusion of IGR in the CAB and BOL is remarkable and crucial in how it recognizes the difference in competencies and authorities between the national government and BARMM government and in the process evoking the aspiration of genuine regional autonomy. IGR promotes dialogue in the face of increasingly complex and interdependent nature of government decision-making. IGR bodies as governmental structure serve as points of harmonization and synchronization of government policies and programs. IGR can be seen as an innovative framework that provides an avenue for close coordination and effective management of government functions. More critically, IGR is crucial to the success of the peace agreement as it also delves on “ what could be” to improve governance and deliver the best results in the interest of the residents in the Bangsamoro. IGR as both a governmental approach and structure constitutes a system of norms or “rules of the game” that give credence to accountability, rule of law and efficiency in public administration.
Undersecretary Herman Jumia, Department of Budget and Management: IGR can be a platform for the national, regional and local governments to come together and discuss policies and other government issues.
Robert Mulana Morochombar Alonto, MILF Negotiator and Member of Bangsamoro Transition Commission: The emergence of an adversarial relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro government must be prevented. Given the unitary set-up, a collision between the two levels of government is a very distinct possibility. IGR can mitigate the negative impact of such occurrences. More importantly, the central government and the Bangsamoro government can get their acts together through the IGR bodies prescribed by the BOL.
Undersecretary Cesar Yano, Department of National Defence: Trust is a key element of the process of designing the IGR mechanism. This is the reason why this feature of the BOL is most welcome because it can lead to a stable security condition in the BARMM area. The interdependence of the national Government and BARMM Government can no longer be ignored.
Atty. Jose Lorena, Member of the BTA: IGR is a fundamental component of the peace agreement between the MILF and Government of the Philippines as evidence by the FAB and the CAB. IGR in a way reflects the asymmetric relationship between the central government and the BARMM regional government. It is indicative of parity of esteem between the two.
Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco, Ateneo Policy Center: The essence of IGR is to facilitate cooperation and collaboration between the different orders of government. Now, it does that primarily to avoid confusion, duplication of delivery of services, duplication of policymaking, fragmentation, and others. Again, the collaboration and cooperation happen at the policy formulation stage and also at the implementation stage. Therefore, IGR has to be seen as a vital component of good governance.
Ramon Casiple, Executive Director of the Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms: IGR in the BOL is a mechanism to address issues in a non-adversarial manner. IGR is a new arrangement for concerns between the regional autonomous government and the national government. It has to do with defining the relationship between the national government and BARMM. IGR is a vital requirement in federal system but in unitary system it may become source of problem.
Atty. Laisa Alamia, Minority Floor Leader, Bangsamoro Transition Authority: IGR is a familiar concept because this has been practiced even in the ARMM, albeit through informal processes. Ministries in the ARMM have already been conducting bilateral coordination with national government agencies in the region to assist them in their operations. But setting up the formal IGR bodies prescribed by the BOL must be done forthwith. That tradition of collaboration between the national government and the regional government must continue on in the BARMM.
Atty. Ishak Mastura, COO of IAG Development Consulting Inc.: IGR in principle is an asymmetric relationship. IGR in the BARMM must abide by this notion of asymmetry to keep true to the FAB and CAB. The BOL is still a national legislation which means the national government is also responsible to implement its provisions. One way of doing this is through the IGR bodies.
Amanda Cats-Baril, International-IDEA: The Philippines can learn a lot from IGR best practices in different parts of the world. Of course, at the core of all of these different experiences and practices is the idea of mutual respect and cooperative ethos between the levels of government implementing IGR. Clearly, IGR in the BOL is an opportunity for the BARMM government to have a smoother and more productive interaction with the central government. This is an opportunity to exemplify good governance in the Bangsamoro region.
Fr. Eliseo R. Mercado Jr., Senior Policy Adviser of IAG: IGR carries with it two considerations- political and technical. And this fact should not inhibit the stakeholders involved from being more imaginative and innovative in activating the IGR bodies mandated by the BOL. However, it is also very important to remember that IGR serves as map or compass for the BARMM. Specifically, in ensuring there is coordination and cooperation between the national government and the Bangsamoro government.
OPPORTUNITIES
1. IGR will lead to genuine and meaningful regional autonomy
It is worth recalling that the purpose of the BOL is to fulfil the mandate of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) to strengthen regional autonomy for the Bangsamoro. Obviously, the BOL is merely a partial fulfilment of the CAB, but for the moment it is a sufficient legal platform to assert Bangsamoro autonomy.
The CAB specifically provides that the relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government shall be asymmetric. This prescription aims to distinguish the Bangsamoro regional government with other local government units. Meaning, its relationship with the national government should be fundamentally different from the relationship of other local governments to the central bureaucracy.
Whilst the word “asymmetric” to describe the relationship of the national government and the Bangsamoro government is not found in the BOL, the statute itself is proof that the Bangsamoro regional governance infrastructure vastly differs from the current local government structure under the Local Government Code of 1991.
First of all, the BOL establishes a ministerial regional government structure with a strong mandate for a disciplined political party system. This framework is unique to the Bangsamoro. Critically however, when employed for the purpose it was designed for, the parliamentary structure makes maintaining good governance over region more probable.
Moreover, the BOL also institutes a robust fiscal autonomy regime, the centerpiece of which is the block grant. This fiscal framework is also unique to the Bangsamoro and when utilized properly and strategically, can indeed lead the Bangsamoro to genuine self-governance.
Therefore, the word “asymmetric” may be absent in the BOL, but the regional governance structure established by this law is certainly distinct from the regular local government apparatus. The political and fiscal autonomy of the Bangsamoro government is clearly more substantial that other local governments.
More critically, according to Atty. Jose Lorena, IGR in a way reflects the asymmetric relationship between the central government and the BARMM regional government. It is indicative of parity of esteem between the two. Indeed, the IGR bodies are the features of the BOL which clearly demonstrate that the Bangsamoro government has an elevated status over other local governments in terms of its relationship with the central government.
Through these IGR mechanisms the Bangsamoro government can be at par with the national government when it comes to the decision-making process involving particular development and governance mandates. This is so contrary to the status of other local governments where most often than not, decisions have been made for them by the national government.
Furthermore, the BOL specifically commands that the Bangsamoro government shall be represented in the departments, offices, commissions, agencies and bureaus of the national government that implement and enforce policies, programs, and projects of the national government in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.
Such a statutory command essentially characterizes the Bangsamoro government as a partner of the central bureaucracy within the Bangsamoro region. Contrary to the treatment of local governments as mere agents of the national government.
One requirement for genuine and meaningful regional autonomy is for the central government to recognize the withdrawal of certain functions and the directive to work with the regional government in a collaborative way. And these particular IGR mechanisms in the BOL, through the mandate to coordinate and resolve issues on intergovernmental relations, can empower the Bangsamoro government to fend off unwarranted national government intrusion in regional affairs.
By design, the fiscal autonomy provisions and the IGR mechanisms in the BOL are venues for the Bangsamoro government to assert true autonomy against the traditional domination of the central government. The political and fiscal governance mechanisms instituted in the BOL are true platforms to exercise effective self-governance. The caveat of course is that the Bangsamoro leadership must assert complete compliance of the BOL. Even if doing this means battling with the national government again, but this time within the confines of the IGR framework.
2. IGR foster good governance in the BARMM
Notably, this need for coordination and cooperation between different orders of government is not unique to the Philippines. The growing complexity of government mandates like transport, water management, environment protection and the like means that roles and responsibilities between levels of government are no longer clear cut and that mechanisms were required to establish definite policy positions, accountabilities and administrative protocols between them. The reality is governments are now mutually dependent in many regards. Responsibilities overlap, policy areas interact, and many public issues cut across several governance competencies. Pertinently, these interdependencies have only increased and have become even more complex.
According to Wilben Mayor, IGR can be seen as an innovative framework that provides an avenue for close coordination and effective management of government functions. More critically, Mayor adds, IGR as both a governmental approach and structure constitutes a system of norms or “rules of the game” that give credence to accountability, rule of law and efficiency in public administration. Therefore, IGR is indeed an integral component of good governance.
The modern conception of governance refers to basically a non-hierarchical mode of governing, where non-state, private corporate actors (formal organizations) participate in the formulation and implementation of public policy.[5] Governance today is to be understood as cooperative networks amongst different levels of government and civil society.
Notably, it is widely acknowledged in academic literature that IGR mechanisms can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of policymaking by avoiding redundancies, duplication, unreasonable fragmentation and ineffective amalgamation. Therefore, having a deeper understanding of the fundamentals of IGR has become extremely important as complexities of modern governance intensify.
According to Atty. Benedicto Bacani, there is really an urgent need to lay down the IGR structures and processes in the BOL. He adds however, that underlying this is the importance of establishing a culture and a mindset of coordination and cooperation between and among all levels of government in the BARMM. Moreover, according to Undersecretary Cesar Yano, trust is a key element of the process of designing the IGR mechanism. The work is clearly not easy, but IGR can indeed foster good governance in the BARMM.
CHALLENGES
1. Balancing IGR with the President’s power of supervision
The President’s oversight power over the BARMM is clearly provided by Article X, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution, “The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.”
The case of Drilon vs. Lim clearly defined the extent of this supervisory power:
“The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed.”[6]
It must be pointed out that the exercise of oversight is not intended to diminish local autonomy. The primary motivation here is to help LGUs be responsive to the needs of their constituencies.
However, the exercise of this power has to be understood in conjunction with Section 1 of Book IV of the Administrative Code, “The Executive Branch shall have such Departments as are necessary for the functional distribution of the work of the President and for the performance of their functions.” The point being, the President exercises his power through the Cabinet comprised of different departments. Precisely for this reason, Cabinet secretaries act as the alter ego of the President executing, with his authority, the power of the Office of the President in their respective departments.[7]
The Supreme Court explains the “alter-ego of the President” principle as follows:
“Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency." As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”[8]
Note that the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, as explained by the Supreme Court, is the imprimatur of Administrative Order No. 273-A which clearly expresses the delegation of the President’s power of supervision over autonomous regions to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). It is worth noting that a petition to nullify this Administrative Order was dismissed by the Supreme Court.[9]
As per Sec. Eduardo Año of the DILG, the underlying thrust of the department’s oversight function is to be facilitative and enabling. The exercise of oversight is not intended to diminish the autonomy of the BARMM. Hence, the DILG does not envision a micromanaging role in BARMM affairs. The primary motivation for the DILG in this regard is to help the BARMM to be successful. Correspondingly, the DILG is likewise motivated to be a positive influence and contributor in the transition process. In order to fulfil this thrust, it will be beneficial both for the national government and the BARMM for the DILG to have a specific officer, preferably with strong links to the region, to hold the position of an Undersecretary dedicated solely to coordinate with the regional government.
There are actually three inter-governmental relations involving the BARMM which requires the creation of IGR mechanisms and all cannot be disassociated with the President’s power of supervision over the BARMM. The first one is the relationship of the national government and the BARMM regional government. IGR mechanisms involving this relationship is specifically mandated by the BOL. The second relationship involves the BARMM regional government and LGUs located within the BARMM. The IGR mechanism for this relationship is likewise mandated by the BOL, although bereft of any specific operational details. (i.e. Council of Leaders) The third relationship involves the national government, the BARMM regional government and the LGUs within the BARMM. The IGR for this relationship is not provided for in the BOL.
However, there is a provision in the BOL that can be very crucial in setting up IGR mechanisms for the last two relationships, to wit:
“SEC. 10. Bangsamoro Government and its Constituent Local Government Units. – The authority of the Bangsamoro Government to regulate the affairs of its constituent local government units shall be guaranteed in accordance with this Organic Law and a Bangsamoro local government code to be enacted by the Parliament. The privileges already enjoyed by local government units under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991,” as amended, and other existing laws shall not be diminished.”
Instead of simply reiterating or mirroring the Local Government Code of 1991, the Bangsamoro Local Government Code can principally focus on institutionalizing the IGR platform for the BARMM regional government and the LGUs within the BARMM. This can be a venue where rationalizing development plans and projects from national to region to LGUs can be done. And this could be the Council of Leaders. As mentioned earlier, the BOL does not provide any operational details for this particular IGR office. The Bangsamoro LGC can fill this gap by providing the operational principles and dynamics of the Council of Leaders as an IGR mechanism between the regional government and LGUs.
Correspondingly, the Bangsamoro LGC can also provide the institutional framework to govern the relationship of the national government, the BARMM government and the LGUS within the BARMM. The aim of course is to establish a more integrated approach in governing the Bangsamoro region, instead of the fragmented style that prevailed in the previous structure. Simply put, the Bangsamoro LGC could embody IGR principles and mechanisms. It cannot amend or supersede the LGC of 1991, but it can rationalize the way the three levels of government within the region relate with each other. It can institutionalize mutual respect and an ethos of interdependence amongst the three.
Still, the reality is the BOL and the BARMM continue to exist within a unitary structure. Hence the ideas of IGR and supervision or oversight, while totally different animals altogether, are necessarily intricately linked to each other. The latter pertains to the relationship of the central government or national government to the sub-national government, whilst the former refers to the system and mechanisms for the different levels of government to cooperate, coordinate or broadly, how to relate to each other in terms of shared responsibilities.
According to Ramon Casiple, IGR can indeed lead to a recalibration of the relationship between the national government and BARMM. He correctly warns though that IGR in a unitary system may become a “source of problem”, specially if presidential supervision and IGR aspirations are not balanced in the right way.
2. Mainstreaming the IGR mindset
According to Undersecretary Cesar Yano, the interdependence of the national Government and BARMM government can no longer be ignored. This is quite a bold statement considering that a culture of dependence on the central government still persists amongst local executives. It is not hard to see that the debilitating “political umbilical cord” to Malacañang, which according to the late Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. was already severed by the LGC, actually continues to pulsate with life. This is one reason why decentralization, including regional autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, has not produced the level of development envisioned by the esteemed lawmaker.
Furthermore, the clause on general supervision has allowed, albeit in a subtle way, the central government, through the office of the Chief Executive, to maintain its dominant stature over the local. And the more troubling effect is that the local leaders of this era have accepted the convention to be constantly deferential to the President. Indeed, when local government executives become highly dependent on the central government, they become particularly vulnerable to the latter’s control.
Note that according to Amanda Cats-Baril, mutual respect and a cooperative ethos between the different levels of government are extremely vital in implementing IGR. The underlying administrative culture may drastically influence the way in which institutional IGR arrangements operate on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, this culture of dependence and deference to the center will make establishing an IGR mindset and culture in the BARMM very difficult. The traditional omnipresence of the President in all aspects of government and the tendency of the central government to dictate public policy are old ways that will have be reconsidered. Indeed, incorporating IGR will also mean invalidating the centralized ethos that has been deeply entrenched in the minds of Filipinos, specially those in the BARMM.
Therefore, the task is not just about activating the IGR bodies mandated by the BOL. It also entails changing how the working relationship between Malacañang and the BARMM regional government and LGUs is fundamentally characterized by the Bangsamoro community, most especially public officials and civil servants. And this may require a thorough and widespread public discourse about incorporating IGR principles in the regional autonomy regime.
CONCLUSION
It cannot be emphasized enough that IGR could be the game-changer for the BARMM. Potentially, the monopoly of the central government in decision-making can be replaced by mutual respect and interdependence. Assuring that there will no longer be a unilateral imposition of public policies by one level of government over the other. Moreover, there can be genuine collaboration amongst stakeholders. At least for some development mandates, the Bangsamoro community can be assured of a coherent approach by the BARMM from planning to execution.
Obviously, there is a lot of work to be done and the first on the list appears to be the activation of the Main IGR Body. And the reason for this is the fact that the BTA has already designated specific officials to represent their side while the President has already assigned the Department of Finance to spearhead the national government side and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process as representative to the joint secretariat.[10] Nevertheless, the BTA, the national government, civil society organizations and academic institutions in the BARMM must keep in mind four caveats which were raised in the IGR National Conference.
The first one is the solid advice shared by Lord Jack McConnel that accomplishing all of the desired reforms for the BARMM, including IGR, will take time. As demonstrated in this policy brief, the process of integrating IGR in the BARMM involves both opportunities and challenges. Therefore, stakeholders to the success of the BARMM should not expect the changes to happen overnight. On the contrary, a deliberate and thoughtful approach is required of them.
Second, it must be noted as well that as correctly asserted by the BTA Minority Floor Leader, Atty. Laisa Alamia, IGR is already a familiar concept because this has been practiced even in the ARMM. The experience of former ARMM personalities in this particular area must not be ignored. On the contrary, they ought to be treated as assets in the whole IGR enterprise for the BARMM. They can certainly be tapped to help bring IGR principles and procedures down to the community level.
Third, it is also important to note that the BOL is a national law. According to Atty. Ishak Mastura, this means the national government is also responsible for the implementation of its provisions. Therefore, the national government has to fulfil its role in the activation of the IGR bodies. It is incumbent upon the central government to perform their part in making sure IGR is properly integrated in the BARMM.
Fourth and last, the words of Fr. Eliseo Mercado Jr. must be taken to heart. IGR is both a political and technical endeavor. The task of integrating IGR in the BARMM requires both imagination and innovation. The job in itself is extremely difficult, but this should not be used as a reason to be closed-minded or dogmatic. The notions of collaboration and collective action must already be manifest at the initial stage. And this requires a paradigm open to dialogue and consensus-building.
In sum, integrating IGR in the BARMM is a responsibility of both the national government and the BTA. Needless to say, civil society organizations and academic institutions in the BARMM play a key supporting role in this undertaking. Precisely for this purpose, a few basic guidelines have been laid out in this policy brief. It is a long and hard road ahead, but for now, the main focus should be all about getting on with the work.
This policy report was written by Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco, LL.M.
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[1] SECTION 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law.
[2] SECTION 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.
[3] See Chapter III of Book I, Sections 25 – 33
[4] See Article VI
[5] R.A.W. Rhodes, ’Understanding Governance. Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability’ (Open University Press, 1997)
[6] Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
[7] See http://www.gov.ph/about/gov/exec/
[8] Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992
[9] See Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
[10] See Memorandum from the Executive Secretary dated October 14, 2019.