Comfort Ero, President & CEO of the International Crisis Group, delivered this keynote address at the “After the Peace Agreements: The Bangsamoro and Beyond” International Conference organized by IAG in Makati City, Philippines on 18 November 2025.

Introduction

Thank you Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer for the kind introduction and for inviting me to Manila to join you for this timely and important conference.

I want to thank the Institute for Autonomy and Governance, the Government of Australia, Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Government and the Southeast Asian Women Peace Mediators for bringing us together this week to examine the state of peacemaking today.

As some of you may know, I am here on behalf of the organisation I lead–the International Crisis Group–of which Professor Coronel Ferrer is a valued member of the board of trustees.

At Crisis Group, our work focuses on preventing and mitigating deadly conflict around the globe and the state of peacemaking is thus an area of concern for my colleagues and I especially at a time when ongoing changes in the international order have a major consequence on wars and the attempts to resolve them.

This is why I wanted to focus my remarks on the state of mediation in the world today, looking at how the global landscape has shifted, what is driving those changes, and what that means for peacemakers and mediators going forward.

Over the past few years, we have seen the erosion of the post–Cold War order that once supported multilateral diplomacy. Conflicts are prolonged and growing increasingly complex, comprehensive peace agreements rarer, and what used to be tried and tested peace tools and international mechanisms have now proven less effective.

At the same time, there are also more active regional actors and middle power states who are stepping in to fill the void, though not without their own limitations.

Today, I want to outline four of the main dimensions shaping mediation as we see them at Crisis Group.

These include the impact of ongoing broader geopolitical shifts, the role of the U.S. and its foreign policy initiatives under President Trump, the rise of middle power states, and finally the multilateral malaise affecting the UN and other institutions at the forefront of global governance.

Geopolitical Changes

Firstly, on geopolitical changes: we are living through an era of intense geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, with respect for international law deteriorating. Depending on where you seat, this may not be a bad thing for those rules have always been unevenly applied by the powerful, who were sometimes seen as using them to constrain others while they gave themselves greater room for manoeuvre.

The UN Security Council–once the cornerstone of global peace efforts—is now deeply divided, often unable to reach consensus on major conflicts, though this week’s Gaza resolution – for all its imperfections – is an exception.

The Council’s failures in Ukraine, Sudan and Myanmar underscore this paralysis and symbolise the end of an era when great powers would still come together, however reluctantly, to forge peace. One can indeed argue that this trend began a decade ago when the Council stood paralysed during the height of the war in Syria.

Today’s conflicts look very different from those of the 1990s or early 2000s. They are more fragmented, multi-layered, and transnational.

Splintered armed groups and criminal economies sustain warfare, and a wide range of external actors meddle in local conflicts to pursue their own aims. One only has to look at the tragedy unfolding in Sudan.

As a result, peace deals are harder to reach and rarely last.

The age of landmark peace accords—like the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia or the Aceh peace deal in Indonesia, or comprehensive peace deals like that in Colombia or, of course here in the Philippines, has largely passed. Of course, we’re encouraged that the Bangsamoro peace process still holds, despite the many challenges piling up - I look forward to conversations about this over the coming days.

UN-led missions, once the go-to instruments for stabilising post-war societies, have become rare and the institution is now reeling as it grapples with massive budget cuts that are sure to further restrict its work.

Many of these trends were evident during a recent visit I made to Syria. The contrast to other post-war settings was palpable as there were no UN-mediated transitional authorities holding sway, no white UN jeeps roaming the streets of Damascus.

These signs–or lack thereof–highlighted how Syria’s next chapter will not be shaped by a a UN-convened group of friends. Rather, regional powers and the U.S. are the outsiders who will set the pace as is the case in many of today’s hotspots.

The Trump Factor

The second major trend I wanted to highlight as shaping mediation today is the “Trump Factor” and the impact of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump’s second term.

We all saw how President Trump campaigned last year as a dealmaker who would end wars and reinvent diplomacy. However, his track record in peacemaking has been mixed.

And while his efforts may fall short when compared to his ambitious pronouncements or to the diplomatic successes of the 1990s, there have been some notable developments.

In Ukraine, his attempts at mediation have failed to tackle the core issue: whether Russian President Putin’s demand for the country’s neutrality and demilitarisation affords any space for Ukrainian sovereignty and safety.

Kyiv and its European backers see U.S. diplomacy as unserious but have little choice but to humour it and manage the fallout. Moscow, having first sensed it might take advantage, continues to chart its own course.

In the Middle East, Trump's inconsistent approach to the Iran nuclear talks created significant problems. Initially, he offered limited Iranian enrichment but then reversed this decision due to pressure from Israel and D.C. hawks. Then came U.S. airstrikes on Iran and the collapse of negotiations. While U.S. participation in the twelve-day war was short, and its pressure likely curtailed Israel’s own bombardment sooner than Netanyahu desired, the entire situation has complicated efforts to address Iran's remaining nuclear programme and increased the likelihood of another war.

In Gaza, Trump pushed for a ceasefire and authorised contact with Hamas — an unprecedented move — but also gave political cover to Israel’s devastating campaign. The latest Gaza “deal” that Arab states helped catalyse, leaves many key issues unresolved and will require sustained U.S. engagement — something Trump has shown little bandwidth for.

We did see the UN Security Council weigh in on the deal yesterday but there are still reasons to be concerned about the implementation of the new resolution which Crisis Group highlighted in a piece we published last week.

Of course Trump also helped broker the ceasefire in South East Asia between Thailand and Cambodia in July but that deal has hit a roadblock after Thai authorities suspended implementation of the truce last week following a landmine explosion.

In South Asia, Trump played up his role in mediating the May ceasefire between India and Pakistan–much to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s chagrin–and subsequently hiked up tariffs on Delhi on grounds of India’s continued purchases of Russian oil.  

Elsewhere, Trump’s envoys have forged other deals including the one between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda which just helped lead to the framework agreement signed in Doha this past weekend.

The U.S. also helped reach preliminary deals between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and with Arab powers involved in Sudan.

The Great Lakes diplomacy helped stall the M23 rebels’ advance, but Qatar did the heavy lifting as we saw with the aforementioned recent framework agreement.

The South Caucasus deal, mostly involving U.S. investment in trade infrastructure, perhaps brought extra momentum to talks already well under way but did not untangle the main sticking point – Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia remove references to Karabakh in its constitution.

For Sudan, the road map agreed among the U,S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is a necessary step but miles from a peace deal.

U.S. involvement has, in other words, mostly yielded quick fixes sometimes guided by transactional interests. The deals that have resulted are largely shorn of specifics, and leave core disputes unresolved and defer the hard work to others.

In the words of an Arab mediator, you have to tee something up for Washington and then assume you’ll have to carry it through.

That said, Trump has injected some new energy into peacemaking, opening doors and creating entry points. Even if the US is less willing or able to lead comprehensive peace efforts, we encourage others to come in and build on some of the quick fixes and stopgap measures Trump has enabled.

The Role of Middle Powers

Now coming to the third trend I want to highlight: the role of assertive middle power states.

As traditional powers remain divided or disengaged, other countries like Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have stepped up as active mediators, reflecting a more multipolar diplomatic landscape.

These middle power states have led or facilitated key talks—from Turkey’s grain-deal mediation in Ukraine and Qatar’s role in Gaza to Omani efforts with the Iran-Saudi rapprochement—often filling gaps left by Western disengagement.

Closer to this region, Malaysia’s role in securing a cessation of hostilities between Thailand and Cambodia is worthy of mention, even if the situation between the two countries remains tense.

These states–while pursuing often very different mediation styles and goals–operate with fewer normative constraints, focusing on more transactional deal-making rather than liberal democracy or social transformation. They are thus often perceived by belligerents to have less ideological baggage than Western states.

Their mediation efforts increasingly emphasise stability and economic recovery over inclusion, rights, and institutional reform—the hallmarks of 1990s Western peacebuilding.

The discussions about “new mediators”, meanwhile often miss that Western states’ own mediation is increasingly questioned by other capitals. Western mediation credibility has declined, and its influence and resources have diminished.

Perceptions of Western countries’ double standards are nothing new but were brought into focus by the Ukraine war and then sharpened further over Gaza, and this has an impact on their effectiveness as mediators.

Crisis Group also acknowledges the reality that many Western capitals don’t have the influence or bandwidth they had some years ago to get involved in or shape mediation efforts.

That said, we have also noted several places where we believe that more, higher level and sustained engagement by Western capitals–U.S. involvement in Sudan being most obvious example–would have been welcome and useful.

Multilateral Malaise

Finally, coming to the multilateral malaise among the leading institutions at the forefront of governing the peace and security landscape: we must start by acknowledging that the bodies that once underpinned global conflict resolution — especially the UN, but also regional blocs like the EU, and the African Union, are all struggling.

The UN Security Council remains deeply divided, too often paralysed by great-power rivalry. Peacekeeping missions continue, but they are under-resourced, politically constrained, and less capable of shaping outcomes.

The jury is out on how the Gaza resolution will fit into this landscape. Mike Walz, U.S. ambassador to the UN, noted before the vote that a failure to adopt the Gaza resolution would have relegated the body to a “bystander” rather than a beacon of international peace and security. In reality, the many challenges to implementing the resolution and managing the various operational hurdles on the ground may yet undermine the Council’s credibility further.

As for the UN Secretariat which is the lifeblood of the institution, the organisation finds itself grappling with the collective trauma of U.S. funding cuts which have hit the UN hard, forcing it into sweeping reductions in staff. This after the UN has already struggled to resolve conflicts or help civilians in places from Gaza to Sudan, and the institution appears to be losing its relevance even further, either finding itself marginalised by key powers or by its own lack of confidence.

The UN still plays a critical role in handling humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks that few other organisations can undertake. When properly resourced, it can offer a safety net for the vulnerable in numerous war zones and a channel for communication among states about divisive issues.

But its decline as a key peacemaking actor corrodes a buffer keeping many armed conflicts from worsening.

Attempts to move conflict-related issues to other forums like the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court have achieved limited results.

Regional organisations face similar constraints. The African Union suffers from leadership and resource challenges; major African states hesitate to empower it.

Here in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s efforts in Myanmar after the 2021 coup were well-intentioned but largely ineffective.

Across the board, there’s a growing scepticism toward institutionalised multilateralism.

Today, mediation is more fragmented, localised, and pragmatic as I mentioned earlier vis-a-vis the middle power states and even President Trump. Mediation initiatives today are also focused less on liberal democracy and more on ceasefire arrangements which can often be imperfect and uneasy and aimed mainly at restoring a minimal level of order and stability even if mostly in the short term.

Conclusion

So, to conclude, where does this leave mediation today?

It is clear that mediation and peacemaking–much like the broader geopolitical landscape–are in a period of transition. The old system of multilateral peacebuilding is fading, but a new one is not yet fully formed.

Peace is sometimes being negotiated through new channels: regional powers, middle states, and private diplomacy, but often without the perceived legitimacy or long-term commitment that global institutions once provided.

In short, the world’s mediators face a tougher terrain than ever before. But challenges also bring opportunities and this is also a chance to reimagine peacebuilding for a more fragmented, multipolar era.

I’ll stop here and am very much looking forward to the interactive segment and to hear your reflections on the state of the peacemaking landscape today and to hearing further reflections throughout some of today’s other sessions.

My gratitude again to all of the organisers and with a special thanks to the Institute for Autonomy and Governance and to Miriam for the kind invitation.