Climate Conflict Action (CCAA) and Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) joint statement on the Bangsamoro political crisis

25 February 2026

The Bangsamoro political settlement is on the brink of collapse. Trust is rapidly eroding between and among the Parties. Hope is under siege by betrayals from both sides. In less than a year, the old conflict divide between State and Non-State actors was upended by a serious divide within the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government.

A week ago, the MILF exposed internal fractures among its core members and deepening tensions between and among its armed combatants. Meanwhile, cracks are appearing at the peace implementation table, where government representatives sit across their MILF counterparts. Cooperation is dissolving into confrontation, as the gains of the past decade disintegrate before the eyes of the agreement’s authors and ardent promoters.

The irony is that the past twelve months foretold this crisis to those who cared to listen.

CCAA and the IAG sounded the alarm nearly a year ago (on August 18, 2025) about expanding horizontal conflict, including clashes between rival armed groups within the MILF, and the resurgence and reemergence of violent extremism. We traced the rise in violence to the stalled decommissioning process, the large and growing number of illicit weapons in circulation, a political transition in gridlock, and the inability and unwillingness of both Parties to acknowledge the structural and institutional flaws in the peace agreement and the fragile peace infrastructure bound to it.

First, the normalization agreement has remained in a vegetative state for over a year and the decommissioning of combatants and their weapons is effectively comatose. This owes principally to the MILF’s unilateral suspension of the decommissioning process and its demand that State efforts to dismantle private armies proceed in tandem with the decommissioning of MILF combatants and weapons. While this demand merits serious attention from both Parties, nowhere in the political settlement does it authorize a unilateral moratorium as a legitimate or acceptable response to this impasse. Embracing this logic resigns both Parties to the very real prospect that no exit agreement will be reached within the next decade or more.

Second, the dismal normalization record and the utter failure of decommissioning, ten years after the political settlement was signed and six years after the organic law was passed, has allowed new and increasingly sophisticated weapons to flow into the Bangsamoro region. This was laid bare in a recent armed attack on a duly elected town mayor using a rifle-propelled grenade (RPG)—a crew-served weapon broadcast to a worldwide audience that should have been among the first arms confiscated under the decommissioning process. The brazenness of the midday attack was stunning; the weapon used, even more so.

Third, a perceptible slide toward yet another suspension of the Bangsamoro election is gaining ground, thinly disguised as concerns about electoral process and timing. A new roadblock is now being mounted on the argument that the delayed election has drastically reduced the timeframe for elected representatives to govern if the parliamentary election runs parallel to the 2028 national polls. Rather than fostering a legitimate and democratic mandate, a new impasse in the political transition is being engineered by those who wish to continue to reign without the right to rule.

We know that political legitimacy is not determined by the length of one’s rule, but by popular choice at the outset. Yet the State sacrificed this democratic imperative when it yielded to MILF demands to postpone parliamentary elections in 2022 and 2025.

In the absence of a legitimizing election, the MILF ruled through acquiescence, but no longer. This consent was shattered when the State engineered a change in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) leadership without the latter’s agreement. This action shredded what remained of the legitimacy possessed by an unelected government. It was an organizational fix to a political problem—and it tore apart the very fabric of cooperation essential to securing an enduring peace.

In the face of a looming crisis, little was done to mend fences and rebuild trust, fulfill outstanding obligations, or restore people’s hopes of meaningful change in the region and the rest of Mindanao.

The inaction stems from an overconfidence rooted in having secured a political settlement that contained critical flaws from the very start and that excluded important input and buy-in from other stakeholders, sectors, and groups. That same overconfidence continues to shape the mindset of those in civil society who are now being weaponized and monetized by both sides. Alternative courses of action proposed by these actors will fail and will only deepen distrust and disunity.

Compounding all of this is a corruption crisis within the BARMM government that has now moved beyond rumor and allegation. Ongoing investigations have already yielded substantiated findings of misuse of public funds and abuse of authority, with more cases still under active review. Corruption at this scale is not merely a governance failure, it is a direct assault on the peace process itself. It diverts resources that were intended to deliver the dividends of peace to communities that have waited decades for meaningful change. It discredits the Bangsamoro project in the eyes of its own constituents and weakens the moral authority of an administration that has yet to secure a democratic mandate. When public trust in institutions is already fragile, corruption accelerates its collapse. The credibility of the political settlement cannot be separated from the credibility of the government tasked with implementing it. Accountability is not optional, it is foundational.

Urgent steps must be taken to restore trust among its stakeholders and rekindle hopes of meaningful change. The process should start with identifying and harnessing mediators who can speak the truth to both sides of the implementing panel and the heads of the multiple parties in the process. The Parties should also temper their language, stop finger pointing, and address issues head on, transparently and in good faith.

One, uphold the agreements enshrined in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). No more deliberate attempts to undermine the agreement to appease any of the Parties. Political transition, where policies, frameworks and intergovernmental relationships are built, clarified, and strengthened, should be prioritized.

Two, ensure a balance between Executive power and the autonomy of BARMM. Prevent the Intergovernmental Relations mechanisms and the implementing panels from undermining the commitments of the Parties under the peace agreement through secret deals and political maneuverings.

Three, stop any attempts to further postpone the parliamentary election and ensure the delivery of a clean and honest election. Legitimacy is determined at the outset and people expect efficient and effective governance even if it runs only for a year or two.

Four, strengthen the peace mechanisms and their oversight functions. These functions should harness reliable and credible baseline data as the basis for evaluating change and development. We likewise demand accountability from both the MILF and Government of the Philippines in completing the normalization targets in full at the soonest.

Five, examine and pilot multiple alternative pathways to address the problems of illicit weapons and the failed decommissioning. Boost firearms registration and ballistic testing following the standards set by Republic Act 10591.

Finally, give equal attention to other emerging issues that can undermine the peace process. Horizontal violence and violent extremism have been increasing amidst growing tensions caused by the friction in the MILF leadership.

We hope these recommendations are imbued in the spirit of Ramadan and the upcoming anniversary of the CAB, and that Parties do not further endanger trust and confidence in the peace process.