Ishak V. Mastura is the Chairman and Managing Head of the Regional Board of Investments of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. He is on the advisory council for Mindanao of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the treasurer and board of trustee of the non-profit foundation and civic organization, ARMM Business Council. He was previously the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Autonomous Regional Government. He was also the longest serving Regional Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao from January 2002 to September 2008. He is a lawyer with a Master of Laws in Petroleum Law and Policy from the University of Dundee, U.K.

Zenonida F. Brosas is the Undersecretary and Deputy Director General of the National Security Council (NSC). Created under the Quirino administration, the NSC is the principal advisory body for the proper coordination and integration of plans and policies affecting national security. Zen served as head of the Government's Technical Working Group on Normalization as well as alternate panel member for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace table. She was also a member of the GPH delegation for the Ad Hoc Level Group for the conversations with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) since 2011. She has a Bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Economics from UP Los Baños and a Masters’ and PhD in Urban and Regional Planning from UP Diliman.

Chetan Kumar is senior advisor with the Governance and Peacebuilding Pillar of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). His current work focuses on the intersection of governance and peace-building, including questions of decentralization and autonomy; the building of national and local capacities, as part of development assistance, for the prevention and resolution of violent conflict or potentially violent tensions; and the constructive management of diversity or rapid change through national or local dialogue. He joined the United Nations in 1999. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, and has authored several publications on issues pertaining to conflict prevention, peace-building, and governance.

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The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG), an independent public policy center devoted to the development of autonomy and good governance for Mindanao peace, makes public our analysis and recommendations on the pending legislation of the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (House Bill 5811 & Senate Bill 2894).

Four (4) Considerations

First, peace agreements between the Philippine government and the Moro revolutionary fronts from the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, Final Peace Agreement in 1996 to the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014 are good roadmaps for the evolving development of meaningful autonomy for peace in Muslim Mindanao.

Second, the full implementation of peace agreements with the Moro fronts is not possible under the country’s prevailing constitutional, legal and political environment. Without public support and legitimacy in the country’s laws and the constitution, the CAB and the BBL cannot be implemented meaningfully and the gains and successes so far achieved are in danger of being further undermined.

Third, more powers and resources in policy and law for Muslim Mindanao will not instantly result in successful autonomy. The ARMM has key powers under its Organic Law that to date are not implemented primarily because of weaknesses in the national bureaucracy to effect real devolution and the timidity and lack of capacity of the autonomous government to assert its powers as a matter of law.

Fourth, the implementation of all peace agreements and legislation of any Basic Law must be inclusive. An autonomy arrangement “franchised” by a group or individual is bound to fail. Processes and structures moving forward must involve and supported by all key stakeholders including minority groups.

State of BBL Legislation

The substitute bills (HB 5811 and SB 2894) depart from the proposed BBL in varying degrees. The passage of the Basic Law dims as Congress tackles the national Budget Law and the 2016 election campaign. Many believe that there is no sufficient time anymore to pass a Basic Law under the Aquino administration. All parties must now accept the hard reality that unless the Philippine constitution is amended, existing peace agreements cannot be fully implemented.

Our Call: Meaningful Autonomy & Transition

At this juncture, what we need is a realistic and doable framework that insures a working autonomy and a good transition from the ARMM to the Bangsamoro. We identify five (5) pillars of autonomy in H.B. 5811 and S.B. 2894 that are “big leaps” for autonomy in policy and practice. These are the “seeds” for the growth of meaningful Bangsamoro autonomy and self-governance in step with successful transition and legal and constitutional reforms.

First, we urge Congress to focus on the legislation of the five (5) pillars:

1. Delineation of powers between the national and regional Bangsamoro government;

2. Parliamentary system with an electoral system that provides equitable allocation for district and party representation;

3. Control of strategic resources by the Bangsamoro government or at least co-management arrangement between the national and regional governments;

4. Block grant;

5. Justice system and Bangsamoro Safety & Security.

Second, we urge policymakers to come up with a realistic, sound and effective transition from ARMM to the Bangsamoro. A successful transition includes policies, processes and structures to effectively implement the five (5) pillars. The transition must provide sufficient time, resources and mechanisms to raise the institutional and human resources capacities of the future Bangsamoro government to build and administer strong autonomous governance infrastructures.

IAG capped off its series of roundtable discussions on Muslim Mindanao autonomy by shedding new light on issues surrounding the normalization process, a key component of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). As in six previous roundtables, IAG Executive Director Benedicto Bacani stressed on approaching the issues at hand from a framework and systems perspective hinged on finding the right balance between the operational and aspirational aspects of the GPH-MILF peace process.

Three experts served as resource speakers during the roundtable discussion: Atty. Ishak Mastura, MILF representative in the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); Gen. Leo Cresente Ferrer, GPH peace panel’s senior military adviser who represented the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in the roundtable; and Dr. Chetan Kumar, senior advisor with the Governance and Peacebuilding Pillar of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Gen. Ferrer devoted his presentation to the overview and timeline of the normalization process under the CAB, Atty. Mastura to the rationale behind TJRC, and Dr. Kumar to best practices culled from international experiences on normalization that are relevant for the Philippines’ context.

Gen. Ferrer explained the understanding of both GPH and MILF peace panels of normalization as a process through which communities affected by the decades-long armed conflict in Mindanao can return to a peaceful life and pursue sustainable livelihoods free from fear of violence and crime. It will simultaneously happen alongside the roadmap towards the creation of the Bangsamoro. Different programs under normalization are aimed at ensuring human security in the Bangsamoro. These include: 1) security aspect, 2) socio-economic development, 3) transitional justice and reconciliation, and 4) confidence-building measures.

Under the security aspect of normalization are transitional components and mechanisms such as the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC) necessary in securing peace on the ground during the transition period to the Bangsamoro. Under the decommissioning program, the MILF will undertake a gradual decommissioning of its forces and turn in weapons so that these are put beyond use. The Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) has been organized to oversee the decommissioning process. A task force will also be created to oversee the disbandment of private armed groups and other armed groups.

Parallel to these efforts are community-based socio-economic programs to reinforce social cohesions and strengthen unity of communities. The GPH and the MILF agree to intensify development efforts for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the Bangsamoro and institute programs to address the needs of MILF combatants, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and poverty-stricken communities.

Meanwhile, the TJRC has been created to undertake a study and recommend to the panels appropriate mechanisms to address the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, correct historical injustices, and address human rights violations. The commission chaired by Switzerland with two members representing GPH and MILF, respectively, was launched in October 2014.

Confidence-building measures, Gen. Ferrer explain, would include transformation of MILF camps into peaceful and productive communities and amnesty and pardon and other available processes towards the resolution of cases of persons charged with or convicted of crimes and offenses connected to the armed conflict in Mindanao.

These different dimensions of the normalization program for the Bangsamoro will undertake a subset of programs and activities to fulfill set goals and objectives as the normalization process progresses through four phases: Phase 1 is from the signing of the Annex on Normalization up to the completion of the verification and validation conducted by the IDB; Phase 2 is from the completion of validation of MILF forces up to the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL); Phase 3 is from the ratification of the BBL up to the establishment and operationalization of the police force for the Bangsamoro; and Phase 4 from the operationalization of the police force for the Bangsamoro up to two months prior to the signing of the Exit Agreement that the evaluation of the panels with the participation of the Third Party Monitoring Team and facilitator that all the commitment of the parties, except the remaining stage of decommissioning, has been completed.

As to the question why normalization was not included in the BBL draft, Gen. Ferrer cited three reasons: 1) the Constitution mandates that every bill shall only embrace one subject and BBL is about the creation of the political entity that will replace the ARMM and which will have more meaningful autonomy, 2) the process of normalization extends beyond the areas covered by the prospective Bangsamoro autonomous region as it includes conflict-affected communities that may be outside the region, and 3) a law is not needed to implement the aspects of normalization (except that of policing). The current legal framework empowers the President to enter into and implement agreements on normalization in the course of promoting public peace.

Explaining the role of TJRC in the normalization process, Atty. Mastura said “transitional justice” as a framework is a new feature in the Philippine peace process, and as such, something that needs fleshing out. He admitted that even the term is subject to some issues or constraints (e.g. whose justice?) He shared that the Swiss model preferred using the phrase “dealing with the past” instead of “transitional justice.”

As in the Swiss model, transitional justice is anchored on four pillars, according to Atty. Mastura: 1) right to know, 2) right to reparation, 3) right to justice, and 4) guarantee of non-recurrence. These pillars form part of a long-term process that aims at establishing rule of law and accountability and transforming conflict-affected communities.

The TJRC is a body created by the GPH and MILF to recommend measures to correct historical injustices and address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people. It has conducted public consultations since its launch in October 2014 until June 2015. Also part of its report to be submitted to the two panel chairs will be recommendations on programs and measures that will bring about the reconciliation of different communities that have been affected by the conflict.

Normalization, according to Atty. Mastura, must be a coherent package, a process that is situated in the whole gamut of peace and security that must include not only passage of the BBL. But he warned that a worst case scenario for the Mindanao peace process will increasingly be realized if a watered down BBL less than the ARMM is passed as the MILF loses credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency in case it accepts or is forced to accept a watered down BBL. He echoed an analysis early this year by IHS Jane’s warning of security risks if the MILF becomes a quasi-government and part rebel group that never fully disarms. IHS Jane’s analysis also pointed out that delay in the roadmap could result in the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) remaining indefinitely as an interim government under a new president who may not share Aquino’s views on peace. Questions on the authority and legitimacy of BTA could give Islamist rebel groups pretext to stage attacks to destabilize it, increasing risks of terrorism in the longer term.

For his part, Dr. Kumar expounded on how different normalization is from the classic DDR (Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration). Normalization, he said, is more of a governance approach focused on communities and collective environments, while DDR is a security approach focused on individual combatants (e.g. taking weapons away.)

More specifically, normalization focuses on all aspects of a situation where violence is stalling development. It seeks to address the political, social and economic factors that are causing recurring cycles of violence through the empowerment of marginalized and aggrieved communities. It focuses on the transformation of communities as much as on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of individual combatants. It is a multi-stakeholder approach premised on the fact that greater participation leads to greater ownership. On the other hand, a state-driven DDR process could yield short-term results, but not lasting security.

Dr. Kumar stressed that violence in the Bangsamoro area has multiple and long-standing causes: a) use of organized violence in politics, 2) lad-related conflicts, 3) rido and related internal displacement, setting the stage for multi-generational conflicts, 4) perceptions of systematic exclusion, marginalization, and sustained violation of basic rights, and 5) lack of viable social, cultural and economic alternatives to violence.

The presence of armed non-state actors is a manifestation of these causes rather than the other way around, according to Dr. Kumar. Hence, to permanently reduce violence, measures to address these factors have to proceed hand in hand with demobilization and decommissioning.

He cautioned that “security” in the Bangsamoro area is provided as much by non-state groups as well as the state and often by the two working together. A “normalization” process will need to transform local assets, rather than suddenly reducing or removing them. Normalization cannot be achieved without the sustained leadership of the top brass of the non-state armed groups, or without the collaboration pf their rank-and-file. Coherent command-and-control has to be maintained throughout the period of the process. This means that normalization will need a step-by-step process, with progress at each step leading to the next set of results. These results will have to be closely tracked – innovations made along the way, Dr. Kumar said.

As to what can the Philippine Congress contribute to normalization, Dr. Kumar said Congress can 1) provide for credible oversight of the process, 2) ensure the participation of women and minorities in all aspects of the process, 3) ensure that funds are available to the national, regional, and local governments to sustain the process; at a minimum it will span the lifetime of two administrations, and 4) continue to remain seized of the matter through periodic reviews; sustained political will is crucial to the success of normalization.